A Change in the Ethnicity/Religiosity of the Hui People Tourism Development: A Case Study of Hui Muslim Society in Yunnan Province, China by Masashi NARA
A Change in the Ethnicity/Religiosity of the
Hui People Tourism Development: A Case Study
of Hui Muslim Society in Yunnan Province,
China
著者 Masashi NARA
journal or
publication title
中国の一帯一路構想の系譜とエスニシティのネット
ワークを介した対外文化戦略の研究
page range 98-111
year 2019-03
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10258/00009832
A in the Ethnicity/Religiosity of the Hui People Tourism
Development:
A Case of Hui Muslim Society in Province, China
Masashi NAEA
Introduction
This paper examines how the ethnicity and religiosity of the Hui
people have changed through the influence of tourism development in
Shadian, Yunnan Province, by focusing on the hospitality practices of the
Hui people towards non-Muslim tourists.
The Chinese government has promoted infrastructure development
both within and outside China under the Belt and Road Initiative. In the
Initiative, Yunnan Province has been positioned as a hub connecting China
with Southeast Asia and South Asia. Therefore, the development of the
infrastructure has also been actively carried out in Yunnan province (e.g. Li
et al. 2016). For example, an airport has been constructed in Mengzi, the seat
of Honghe Hard and Yi Autonomous Prefecture, which is located about 30
kilometers from Shadian, the field site for this paper.
Moreover, the Initiative includes an enhancement of cooperation in
the tourism sector and the expansion of tourism between China and
neighboring countries (e.g. Yu 2016). The development of the transportation
infrastructure has been expected to bring about a beneficial influence for the
tourism industry, especially with regard to ecotourism and ethnic tourism,
which together comprise one of the key industries in Yunnan Province, in
which many ethnic minorities live. The Hui society is no exception.
However, non-Muslim tourists have been generally unwelcome guests
for the Hui people. For example, when I first began carrying out fieldwork in
Yunnan province, local Hui Muslims often asked me are you Hui people?59
Then, when they learned that I was not of the Hui people, they told me "this
is a place for Hui people, get out here!" (Nara 2016).
Historically, Hui people tended to have an exclusive attitude toward
non-Muslims, especially since the end of the Qing dynasty when the Han
people carried out a large-scale slaughter of the Hui people (Nara 2016).
Moreover, the Islamic revival in the post-Mao era has caused rigid religious
discourse to become more influential in Hui society. Consequently, that has
seemingly strengthened their exclusiveness more than ever before.
However, Hui people recently began to actively accept non-Muslim
tourists in Shadian. For example, one of the largest mosques in Shadian
organized tour guides for tourists, including those who were non-M^uslim.
This paper examines such a change, focusing on the relationship between a
change in the ethnicity and religiosity of the Hui people associated with an
Islamic revival in the post-Mao era and tourism development resulting from
the governmental initiative.
The previous literature about the religious revival in contemporary
China was inclined to regard the revival of religions as a result of politics
between the state and religious groups, such as resistance and negotiation
(e.g. Madsen 1998). For example, Gillette argued, especially focusing on the
consumption of the Hui people, Hui people challenge the evolutionism
ideology of the Chinese Communist party, which subordinates the Hui
people to the Han people through Arabization (Gillette 2000).
This kind of monograph sheds light on an important aspect of the
religious revival in contemporary China that should not be dismissed.
However, various factors, such as rapid economic development, social change
in tandem with this development, and internationalization, have influenced
religions in China since the 1980s. Ashiwa and Wank emphasized the
importance of understanding religion in the context of a process of
modernization that progresses through interactions among multiple actors,
such as the state, religious associations, the clergy, and ordinary believers
(Ashiwa and Wank 2009). According to their argument, a primarily
dichotomic framework of the state and religion could not sufficiently explain
the religious situation in contemporary China. For example, Yang has
argued that the development of the domestic economy via the economic
reforms has facilitated a religious revival in contemporary China (Yang
2000). According to their arguments, it is necessary to focus on various
political processes amongst these diverse actors to constitute the domain of
religion (cf. Asad 1993; 2003).
Grounded in the above, this paper focuses on the relationship between
tourism development initiated by the Chinese government and the Islamic
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revival since the economic reform. This article is based on fieldwork
conducted in Yunnan province, China. This research was carried out
between 2008 and 2018. Considering that religion is one of many sensitive
problems in China, I have opted to use pseudonyms for people and places to
protect my informants.
The following section will demonstrate how ethnic tourism in Hui
society has developed under the governmental initiative that aims to redress
the gap between the rich coastal areas and the poor inland areas where a lot
of ethnic minorities live, and to develop the national identity of the Chinese
nation. This section will argue that Hui Muslims9 attitude of actively
accepting non-Muslim tourists of other ethnic groups is seemingly related to
the influence of ethnic tourism development initiated by the government.
However, the third section of this article will reveal that this change in
attitude cannot be reduced to a mere function of the influence of ethnic
tourism development. This section will situate the Hui?s attitude toward
non-Muslims of other ethnic groups in the process of religious revival in the
post-Mao era. Therefore, this section will describe a change in the ethnicity
and religiosity of the Hui People in tandem with the Islamic revival.
Subsequently, the forth section will demonstrate how the development of
ethnic tourism and process of Islamic revival have become entangled in
Shadian. The last section will examine the extent to which it is possible that
the entanglement of the development .of ethnic tourism and the Islamic
revival has enabled the Hui people to open up in Shadian.
Development of Tourism in China
Since the economic reform, domestic tourism has been rapidly
developing in China. For example, the number of Chinese domestic travelers
reached 878 million in 2002. This means that China has formed the largest
market of domestic tourism in the world (UNWTO 2016). Ethnic tourism in
China has also developed in tandem with the development of domestic
tourism. For example, under the governmental initiative, ethnic theme parks
have opened one after another in various locations throughout China since
the 1980s. In 1992, Yunnan Ethnic Village (.Yunnan Minzu Cuii), which
exhibits the cultures of 26 ethnic groups living in Yunnan province, opened
in Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province. Previous literature has argued
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that such government-led ethnic tourism development in regions where
many ethnic minorities live has aimed to redress the gap between the rich
coastal areas and the poor inland areas, and furthermore, is intended to
develop national identity.
The areas where Muslim minorities live are no exception. One of
these areas is Shadian. Shadian is one of the towns in Gejiu city, Honghe
Hani and Yi Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan Province. Shadian has a
population of about 13,500. The Hui population comprises about 90 percent
of the total population of Shadian. Therefore, the Hui people are an ethnic
majority group in Shadian. Moreover, Shadian has produced a number of
Islamic scholars, such as Ma Jian, who was a professor at Beijing University
and translated the Quran into Chinese. Therefore, Shadian has historically
been one of the centers of Chinese Islam (Nara 2016). Furthermore, Shadian
is famous for the Shadian incident during the Great Cultural Revolution.
More than nine hundred local Hui people lay dead following this incident
(Ma 1988).
Now, Shadian is famous for its large mosque. This mosque is called
the Shadian Grand Mosque {Shadian Da Qingzhensi). The construction of
this mosque began in 2007 and was completed in 2010. Moreover, tourism
development was initiated by the government in tandem with the
construction of the mosque (Gejiue-Shi Nianjian Bianji-Zu (ed.) 2009). This
was one of the projects aimed towards tourism development aHui People
Cultural Tourism Town in China {Zhongguo, Shadian Huizu Wenhua Liiyou
Xiaozhen)!' The government planned to invest 2.9 billion Chinese yuan into
this project at that time. Moreover, 575 million Chinese yuan had already
been invested in 2013. For example, the walking paths for tourists have been
improved through this project in Shadian. As a result, Shadian obtained the
designation of "Class 4A Tourism Destination in China {Guojia 4A Ji Liiyou
Jingqu)" (Gejiue-Shi Nianjian Bianji-Zu (ed.) 2012). The Chinese government
set up a tourist attraction rating system in China which has five categories^
A (1A, the lowest level), AA (2A), AAA (3A), AAAA (4A), and AAAAA (5A, the
highest level). Moreover, the number of tourists visiting Shadian exceeded
150 thousand in 2013 and the amount of tourism revenue exceeded 2 million
Chinese yuan (Gejiue-Shi Nianjian Bianji-Zu (ed.) 2013). Furthermore, large
sightseeing buses transporting tourists from the coastal areas have started
to come to Shadian.
- 101 -
As a result of this situation, the Shadian Grand mosque set up an
attendant at the mosque for tourists in 2014. The mosque recruited
volunteer guides at the same time and by 2016, there were 34 local Muslim
volunteer guides. This constituted a significant change in the Hui people's
attitude toward non-Mjislims in other ethnic groups, because they had
previously been perceived as unwelcome visitors by the Hui people, as
mentioned above. Moreover, Shadian especially tended to be disliked and
avoided, not only by non-Muslims of other ethnic groups but also by the Hui
people. During a conversation about Shadian, a Han female in her forties
working in Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province, said to me, They were
peddling drugs, so Shadian was dangerous." Moreover, during a conversation
about changes in Shadian, a Hui male in his fifties working in Kunming said
to me, "When I had to go through Shadian in the early 19909s because of my
business trip, I wanted to pass through as soon as possible." Thus, Hui
people are inclined to have an exclusionist attitude toward non-Muslims of
other ethnic groups. Moreover, Shadian also tended to be avoided by
outsiders. Nevertheless, Shadian has actively engaged with both
non-Muslim tourists and non-Muslims. How is it possible to understand such
a change in Hui society?
Focusing on the explanation to tourists provided by local Muslim
volunteer guides, the Hui people have seemed to claim the identity of a
"Chinese nation {Zhonghua MinzuT with a configuration that is both plural
and united (Fei 1989); as such, the guides9 explanation to the tourists
emphasized the plurality and unity of the Chinese nation. For example,
when explaining the governmental slogan, one of guides in his twenties said
to tourists, "Patriotism and love of the religion {Aiguo AijiaoT'^ 'Tatriotism is
the most important for us Chinese nation. Based on it, we Hui people believe
in Allah, love the religion." Moreover, when explaining a square in front of
the mosque, he also said 'There are no walls in our mosque, so anyone can
come in. The square that we can see from here is called "Harmonious square
(ffexie Guangchang)^ and this is a space for national unity {Minzu
Tuanjie)!' Therefore, at a glance, Hui people seem to have accepted tourists
in accordance with the ethnic tourism development led by the government.
However, this change in the Hui people's attitude toward outsiders
could not be merely reduced to the influence of ethnic tourism development,
because it has also been related with a religious revival in the post-lVtao era.
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A rapid revival of religion has occurred in China due to the abatement of religious
policies since the economic reform. Islam in Hui ]V[uslim society is no exception.
Ethnic tourism development and the Islamic revival have been developing together.
Revival a in Ethnicity/Religiosity of Hui People
A rapid revival of religion has occurred through the abatement of the
Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) religious policies since the late 1970s.
This is a noticeable reaction to the Great Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) in
which religion was suppressed. The policies of reform and opening called
Gaige Kaifang introduced by Deng Xiaoping in December 1978 included a
relaxation of the restrictions on religious activities. The CCP9s approach
toward religion was formalized in a 1982 CCP directive called On the Basic
Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question during Our Country's
Socialist Period (Document 19) (Ashiwa and Wank 2009^ 10-ll). Religious
liberty was partially recovered, although it still functioned within conditions
controlled by the government. This situation is also true of Shadian. For
example, the number of mosques increased from three mosques before the
economic reform to 10 mosques in the post-Mao era. The Shadian Grand
mosque, as mentioned above, was rebuilt as part of this process (Nara 2015;
2016).
This transition in religious policy became a primary factor that
brought about a revival in Islam. Therefore, Islamic activities, such as
Islamic education, haji (pilgrimage to Mecca), and the repair of mosques
have also been activated since the 19809s in Hui society (e.g. Nara 2018). For
example, the number of haji has been rapidly increasing every year since
1989. Pilgrims to Mecca in Kunming increased from a mere two in 1989
(Kunming-Shi Renmin Zhengfu (ed.). 1990: 108) to 113 in 2009 (Nara 2015).
With this Islamic revival, a more rigid Islamic discourse, such as Salafi
religious discourse, has had an increasing impact on Hui Muslim society.
Some factors in the increasing prominence of these discourses are the
influence of Hui Muslims who studied in Islamic countries, the facilitation of
access to Islamic knowledge through the spread of the Chinese translation of
foreign Islamic thought (De Angelis 1997) and Islamic websites in Chinese,
among others (Nara 2013; 2016). As a result, this has led to a pietization of a
section ofHui Muslim society (cf. Turner 2008; 2010).
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Consequently, Hui Muslims who became pious have objectified
Muslim consciousness (e.g. Eickelman and Piscatori 1996). Such an
experience is referred to as "recognize Allah {Renshi Anla)" m my fieldwork.
For those Hui people who became more pious, the main criterion for being
Muslim has become the strict practice of faith in Islam through
objectification. In other words, 'being IVtuslim9 has not been an inherent Hui
attribute until recently. Therefore, Hui Muslims who recognize Allah do not
regard Hanicized Hui Muslims as Muslims. For example, a Hui male in his
twenties who practices Islam said to me, 'They are Hui people but not
Muslim. They only avoid eating pork. They don't know anything about
Islam." This kind of statement is often made, especially among local Hui
people who became pious. This means that pious Hui Muslims have come to
separate the quality of being IVtuslim (one's religion) from that of being Hui
(one's ethnicity), which constitutes a significant change, as the two had
previously been regarded as inseparable classifications.
This change seemingly renders Hui Muslims more exclusive.
However, this separation of religiosity and ethnicity among Hui Muslims
enables them to regard non-Hui people as potential Muslims. For example,
recently, some Hui people have often interrupted the conversation following
questions by Hui people in mosques, with queries such as "are you Hui
people?" as mentioned in the first section, and made statements such as,
aHui people is just an ethnic minority in China. Islam is for all mankind. So,
you should ask him 'are you Muslim?9.99 Furthermore, this kind of Hui
Muslim, who became pious, shows a marked tendency to welcome
non-Muslim outsiders coming to mosques (Nara 2016). Such a change in the
ethnicity and religiosity of the Hui people is closely related with the
development of ethnic tourism in Shadian.
of
This section will examine the development of ethnic tourism in the
context of the religious revival occurring since the economic reform and may
shed light on other aspects of the development of ethnic tourism. As
mentioned above, local Hui Muslim volunteer guides' explanations are
seemingly based on the governmental discourse about the concept of a
Chinese nation. However, at the same time, they attempt to spread Islamic
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beliefs to other non-Muslim tourists through an explanation on the existence
of Allah, the prophet Muhammad, the position of women in Islam, and how
to perform the daily prayers in Islam,. Most of the clergymen in the Shadian
Grand mosque regard the opportunities for communication that result from
ethnic tourism as chances to propagate Islam. For example, when I asked
about the mosque's attitude toward non-Muslim tourists, one of the
clergymen in the mosque in his twenties who manages the attendants said,
aAt first, there were conflicts between local Muslims and tourists because
they didn't know Islam, for example, some of female tourists dressed
skimpily. But now most of us have come to regard it as a chance for
spreading Islamic belief to them." Therefore, the mosque set up an attendant
for tourists and recruited local Muslim volunteer guides.
Moreover, most of the volunteer guides also aim to propagate Islamic
beliefs by acting as guides. For example, in an interview about his
motivation to act as a guide, one of the guides in his twenties told me,
aThe Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) had to go to propagate
Islam, and our ancestors of Hui people also had to go to do so by
themselves when they just arrived in China. But now they will come here
if we do nothing special. That is a very happy thing."
This kind of motivation to act as a guide is shared among them.
Therefore, they proactively give an explanation about Islam, their mosque,
and the Hui people when parties of tourists arrive at the mosque in large
sightseeing buses. Such a party of tourists consists of dozens of people. The
travel agency contacts the mosque in advance when such a party comes to
the mosque.
However, there are various types of non-M^uslim visitors to the
Shadian Grand Mosque. In addition to groups of tourists, many individual
tourists or small groups of tourists visit as well. Most come to the mosque
simply to take a picture of the mosque. There are many tourists with this
motivation, especially in the evenings because the mosque is lit up at night.
Moreover, some tourists come to the mosque to take a picture for a
commemorative wedding album. In an interview about the development of
tourism in Shadian, a local Hui female in her thirties sarcastically explains
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such a situation by saying, The Shadian Grand IVtosque is a charge free
tourist spot/9
However, most of the local Hui are not necessarily negative toward
such a situation. While acting as a guide, one of the volunteer guides in his
teens told me, "Recently more than one couple who is getting married soon
comes to the mosque to take a photo every day. Some of them are not
Muslims. Even so, it is a good opportunity for them to touch upon Islam."
Furthermore, local ordinary Muslims also tend to expect that the
development of ethnic tourism will lead to the propagation of Islam to
non-Muslim in other ethnic groups. For example, during a conversation
about the attendants at the Shadian Grand Mosque, a local Hui male in his
forties said to me, "We should make a strong effort to train up the attendant
at the mosque in order that they become able to propagate Islam better to an
increasing number of tourists."
Conversely, non-Muslim tourists do not necessarily develop a
national identity as a unified Chinese nation through ethnic tourism in
Shadian, because their motivation for tourism in Shadian is based on
otherizing" Hui people. This is demonstrated by the phenomenon in which
non-Muslim tourists have rapidly increased following the 2014 Kunming
attack. The Kunming attack was a terrorist attack that occurred in the
Kunming Railway Station on 1 IVEarch 2014 and caused more than 170
casualties. Moreover, the attackers are said to have been Xinjiang9s Uyghur
separatist terrorists who allegedly planned the attack and trained for it in
Shadian.1 According to local Hui Muslims in Shadian, this terror attack did
not decrease the number of non-Muslim tourists, and instead caused an
increase in their number. In an interview about the influence of the terror
attack, a Hui male volunteer guide in his twenties said to me, "Non-Muslim
tourists have been rather increasing since the terror attack. They have not
been decreasing at all." According to him, more than two thousand tourists
visited Shadian during the first spring festival following the terror attack in
Kunming. This was the largest number of tourists per day.
]V[oreover, another Hui male volunteer guide in his twenties
explained the cause of the increase in non-Muslim tourists to me when he
said, "Non-M^uslim tourists come to Shadian in order to see what kind of
' Xinhua Net (http://news.xinhuanet.com/photo/2014-09/12/c_126981249.htm),
referred on October 15, 2018.
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place the terrorists gathered in out of mere curiosity.9' He also said that a lot
of non-Muslims learned that Shadian has one of the biggest mosques in
China and a robust Islamic landscape through the terror attack. In other
words, non-Muslim tourists see Shadian as aa den of terrorists." According to
him, other ethnic minorities living around Shadian, who had not previously
been interested in Shadian and the Hui people, have also come to the
mosque.
Thus, the development of ethnic tourism has progressed in Shadian
in tandem with the Islamic revival since the economic reform. Therefore, the
improvement in the inter-ethnic relationship cannot be reduced to a mere
function of the influence of ethnic tourism, though it has seemingly improved
through the development of ethnic tourism. In actuality, a change in the
religiosity and ethnicity of the Hui people, in accordance with the Islamic
revival in the post-Mao era, has been an important factor in their acceptance
of norrMuslim tourists. Ethnic tourism gives the Hui people an opportunity
to propagate Islam, because they have come to regard non-Mnslims of other
ethnic groups as potential Muslims through the separation of their
religiosity and ethnicity. Conversely, some also maintain the perception that
Shadian is aa den of terrorists9 and not a tourism spot representing "the
plurality and unity of Chinese nation/9 especially following the terror attack
in Kunming. In other words, the improvement in inter-ethnic relationships
has not necessarily occurred through the sharing of their interests or
national identity, but has instead come about through the entanglement of
changes in the religiosity and ethnicity of the Hui people and the
development of ethnic tourism that has generated a context in which contact
can occur (Pratt 1991) between the Hui people and non-Muslims of other
ethnic groups.
Conclusion
The Belt and Road Initiative has activated the cross'regional
movement of people from home and abroad by establishing a wide economic
zone and the development of supporting infrastructure. This is expected to
lead to the development of the tourism industry. Moreover, ethnic tourism
has developed under the governmental initiative that aimed to develop
regions inhabited by ethnic minorities and the national identity. However,
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local Hui Mjislims have come to actively accept non-Muslim tourists because
of the recent separation of aHui?? as an ethnic category and "Muslim" as a
religious category, in accordance with the Islamic revival in the post-Mao era.
In this context, the Hui people regard tourism as an opportunity for the
propagation of Islam.
This means that tourism has provided the Hui people with the
possibility of evading the governmental control of religion. Islamic activities
are legally limited to officially authorized mosques in China. In contrast,
informal religious activities are strictly controlled by the government (e.g.
Nara 2018). These informal religious activities include Islamic missionary
work. Therefore, the tourism development led by the government generates
an ambiguous space which entangles religion and tourism. Furthermore,
tourism development provides the local Hui people with an opportunity to
propagate Islam to non-Muslims. In other words, the tourism development
resulting from the Belt and Road Initiative might expand religion in the face
of the government's intention to restrain religious activities.
As mentioned above, the entanglement of religion and tourism has taken
place even following the terror attack in Kunming, even though the Uyghur
people living in Shadian were forcibly deported back to Xinjiang, the budget
for tourism development was frozen, and a police box was established in
front of the Shadian Grand IVtosque. However, now, such an ambiguous space
has shrunk in size and potential as a result of the governmental regulations
against religious activities in Shadian under the Xi Jingping administration.
One of the volunteer guides at the mosque told me, "The government hinders
us from communicating with tourists now/9 A clergyman in charge of the
attendants at the mosque left the mosque. Therefore, the attendant
infrastructure is not functioning effectively now. In the evening, as many
tourists visit the mosque to see it lit up, Shadian is colored by rows of
glowing red plastic national flags attached to street lamps. One of the guides
said to me, aThe elderly said it's like the atmosphere of the Great Cultural
Revolution." According to local Hui Muslims, there are more than 500
cameras monitoring Shadian. In fact, the cameras flashed several times
when I was walking down the street in Shadian. I would like to examine how
they address the current situation in which governmental control is
strengthening in this way in future research.
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